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The White House said the test, if confirmed, would constitute "a provocative act".

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Modestly surprising but I don't think anything particularly dramatic is going to come of it. I think China and South Korea are the only ones who can really do anything about it.

Now, if there was oil in North Korea, it would be a different matter altogether...

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South Korea would be thrilled if they could just merge / take over North Korea in the same fashion as Germany reunified.

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Given the level of Chinese pull in North Korea, they could very well decide they've had enough with the present North Korean government.

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The U.S. forces in South Korea are that much farther away from the border with China. As such, China is decidedly not interested in any kind of Korean unification.

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Bilateral diplomacy, in the form of direct talks and negotiation with DPRK, would seem to be the best way to slow down the escalating tensions

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What would you say to them through bilateral diplomacy "in the form of direct talks and negotiation"? What can you possibly say to make them stop?

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Where a country like North Korea is engaged in conduct that we would like to stop, we have three options:
(1) wage war against them;
(2) engage in diplomacy and attempt to reach a negotiated solution; or
(3) do nothing.

If we remove option (2) from the list -- as Bush followers want to do in almost every case and as the administration repeatedly does -- it means that only options (1) and (3) remain. And where option (1) is not viable -- as is the case with the U.S. vis-a-vis North Korea (mostly because we already chose option (1) with two other countries and are threatening to do so with a third) -- then the only option left is (3) -- do nothing. That is exactly what we have done while North Korea became a nuclear-armed power, and we did nothing because we operated from Rubin's premise that diplomacy and negotiations are essentially worthless, which left us with no other options.

This toxic notion that hostile countries can't be negotiated with -- or that attempts to negotiate with them are thinly disguised gestures of weakness, appeasement and surrender -- seems to be grounded in the belief, one could almost say the neurosis, that every country is Nazi Germany and every leader is Hitler and therefore are beyond reason. But none of the countries whom we are told can't be negotiated with has displayed that type of irrationality or self-destruction. To the contrary, Kim Jong Il -- like Saddam Hussein -- seems obsessed with self-preservation and with perpetuating the power of his regime. The same could be said for Syria's Bashar Assad, just like his father before him. And whatever else one wants to say about them, the Iranian mullahs seem to be among the most rational and calculating actors on the world stage.

They may be oppressive and tyrannical and even evil. But that doesn't mean they are irrational or beyond the realm of reason. What seems irrational is the refusal to negotiate with them, because we then have no good options. We can't wage endless war. In fact, we can't even successfully wage the current wars we are fighting given our limited resources. And even if we could, doing so doesn't seem to enable us to achieve our objectives (see e.g., Iraq and, more and more, Afghanistan).

Diplomacy and negotiations -- including with irrational and oppressive regimes -- have been the key to maintaining stability and peace since the end of World War I, at least. Ronald Reagan fought against the same anti-diplomacy factions now in order to negotiate with the Soviet Union precisely because it was the only real option. Once you decide that negotiations are a worthless instrument, you're left with only two options -- endless war-making, or standing by and doing nothing in the face of growing dangers.

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I'm far more worried about the US having nukes than I ever will be about North Korea. Or China, or France or Pakistan.

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I'm far more worried about the US having nukes than I ever will be about North Korea. Or China, or France or Pakistan.

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A couple of commenters have argued that there is a fourth option -- U.N. sanctions -- but sanctions are properly seen as a negotiating tool and thus a subset of option (2). Sanctions are intended to pressure a country into capitulating to an agreement on favorable terms. But whether they are viewed as a tool for negotiations or as an option unto themselves, they are scorned just the same by the anti-diplomacy crowd as a form of "appeasement." The argument that is advanced is that countries such as North Korea and Iran are so irrational, deceitful and evil that they can never be trusted to comply with the terms of any agreement -- whether the agreement is brought about by negotiations or sanctions. Only regime change, via military force, provides the necessary assurances.

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The answer to your question is simple, and best expressed in the words of blogger Glenn Greenwald

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In the post 9/11 world, states with nuclear weapons and states attempting to acquire nuclear weapons have a close eye being kept on them. One of these nation states that the US and the world are watching is North Korea. North Korea was officially created in September of 1948. The United Nations had created an election commission to oversea the elections for the entire Korean peninsula. However, the communist government in the north refused to cooperate and held its own elections. With the North and South having it’s own form of government, they both also had different ideas on reunification of the North and South. In June of 1950, war broke out between the two rivals. At first, the fast advancing northern army easily overran the south’s forces, but with the reinforced United State’s army, they pushed them back up north all the way to Pyongyang. From there, Chinese “volunteer” soldiers drove the UN force again to the south, where fighting would take place for two years. After more than three years of fighting, a truce was signed on July 27, 1953.

After the Korean War, Kim II Sung’s (North Korean’s leader) foreign policy was still concentrated on reunification of the north and south. Both sides made overtures towards each other, but no progress was ever made. Even to this day, the North Korean’s government’s foreign policy is still geared toward reunification, but now he has an ace up his sleeve that he did not have before. The Korean government has access to nuclear weapons and technology, presenting a problem for both the world and especially the United States with its large contingent of forces in the south. Even in present time, North Korea seems to be a thorn in the side of the US and its allies in the region. It has become a difficult situation for the current and prior administrations as to how to handle the situation with the Korean government. It has become a cat and mouse game between a “wild” dictator from the North Korean government, and the current and prior administrations. Both sides have to look and their cards in their hand, play wisely, and try to get the upper hand on each other.

From the end of the Korean War, North Korea did not have a lot of activity until the nuclear issue. Not until the mid 1980s, was the world starting to face a stand off with the North Korean government. In December of 1985, North Korea had agreed to sign on to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). Under the articles prescribed in the treaty, North Korea has eighteen months from the date that they signed the treaty, to stop all producing and researching of nuclear weapons. North Korea linked their adherence to the treaty, to the withdrawal of the United State’s nuclear weapons that were based in South Korea. In September of 1991, President Bush withdrew all nuclear weapons based abroad, 100 of those that were based in South Korea. In response to this, President Tae Woo of South Korea announced that he would declare a nuclear free Korean peninsula, which prohibits possession of nuclear weapons and nuclear processing facilities. By the end of 1991, both the North and South had signed the act. In 1992, North Korea and declared nuclear materials to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the IAEA found problems in the initial report and asked the North to clarify some issues.
In early 1993, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two sites that were believed to store nuclear waste. North Korea in turn refused to allow these inspectors to enter their country. Then North Korea announced that it would be withdrawing from the NPT within three months.

North Korea used a provision within article X of the NPT that allows a country to withdraw for supreme national security considerations. After talks with the United States in June, North Korea suspended the withdrawal from the NPT, and agreed to the full application of the IAEA safeguards. For the United States’ part, the US agreed not to use any force (nuclear or conventional) against North Korea. After a second meeting between the US and NK, the North agreed to start renegotiating with the IAEA on inspections and stated that, they might be willing to make a deal with the US to replace the North’s nuclear reactors with light water reactors, which are proliferation resistant.

In the beginning of 1994, after negotiating with the IAEA, the North agreed to allow the inspection of seven of its declared nuclear facilities. A month after the agreement was made; the inspectors arrived in the north. While the inspections were being conducted, one of the inspection teams ran into a snag. They were denied access to a plutonium processing plant at one of the sites. The IAEA in turn, responded with a “slap on the wrist” by demanding that the north comply with all the agreements and safeguards that they had agreed too.

In the following June of that year, North Korea announced the withdrawal from the IAEA, the IAEA contended that even though the Korean government withdrew, the agreements in the NPT were still being honored by the Korean government. The only difference is that North Korea is not an active member of the agency.

An agreement was finally reached after three months of bilateral talks with the United States and its allies. Under the agreement, Pyongyang current and future nuclear weapon’s program would be terminated in return for economic benefits. The deal that was reached would not be fully implemented for another decade, but it was a good breakthrough. Pyongyang announced on November 1, 1994 that it was taking the appropriate steps to implement the framework agreement that was reached on October 21, 1994. Some of the key agreements on this framework were:

• North Korea would get a letter of assurance from the United States that would make arrangements for the provision of the light water reactor project, with a target date of 2003

• International Community would supply an alternative source of fuel while the North’s reactors were frozen – The alternative energy would be in the form of heavily oil for heating and electricity, the rate would be 500,000 tons annually

• Upon assurances from the United States for the delivery of alternative fuel sources, the North would freeze its reactors and eventually dismantle - The dismantling of the reactors will be completed when the LWR project is completed
- The freeze on the reactors will be fully implemented within one month of October 20, 1994, the IAEA will be allowed to monitor this freeze

• After October 20th, a date will be set for US and the North’s experts to talk

• After set of talks, will discuss arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition

• Within three months of October 20th, both the US and North Korea would reduce trade barriers and investments -Will also upgrade bilateral relations to Ambassador status


While the agreement states that the spent nuclear rods must be moved to a third country before the components for the first two light water reactors is received by the North, the rods will still remain in North Korea’s supervision for years. This is not an optimum setting for the US, but it is good enough for a starting point. The IAEA took the role of monitoring North Korea and its compliance with the framework that North Korea had agreed with. The IAEA was designated to start the monitoring of North Korea around the end of November. On November 28, 1994, the IAEA had announced that there was confirmation that work had been halted at both the Nyongbyon and Taochon nuclear facilities; both of these facilities were also considered non-operational by the IAEA.

Between the end of 1994 and 2000, the majority of issues that the US had to deal with in their relations with North Korea were over the building and exporting of missiles. Probably the most important situation had arisen in August of 1998 when the North Koreans had launched a three stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket. This launched alarms across the US intelligence community, as it caught them off guard on how far Pyonang really was in their missile research and acquired technology.
The other big issue in this period was the amount of sanctions that the United States had put on North Korea and its coporations. Multiple different situations put sanctions on North Korea, their trading partners (such as Iran or Pakistan) or corporations that have ties with the North. Some inspections were done between 94 and 2000, but no evidence was found to show any violation of the framework that was agreed upon back in 1994. In late 1999, (five years after the agreement was signed) officials signed a key contract with the Korea Electric Power Corporation to begin the construction of two light water reactors in Kumho, North Korea. The reason behind the delay to get the contract signed was related to the complexity of legal and financial challenges, along with the tense situation from the political climate related to the launch of the Taepo Dung-1 missile back in August of 1998. In the year 2000, the US imposed more sanctions on a North Korean firm for supplying missile technology to other countries such as Iran. North Korea was not showing any slow down in its supplying of other countries with missile technology. The United States conducted another inspection of a site in North Korea in May of 2000; the conditions had not changed since the first inspection in May of 1999.

With the election of a new US President in 2000, North Korea was not sure as to how the new administration was going to handle the foreign policy with Pyongyang. At a press conference, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated “plan to engage with North Korea is to pick up where President Clinton left off. Some promising elements were left on the table and we will be examining those elements.” After a meeting with South Korean President Jim Dae-jung, President Bush told reporters that he “looks forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.” The North Korean government didn’t take too kindly to these words or the tone that was used, and they canceled a meeting with the United States. This meeting had been arranged so that the two sides would discuss political reconciliation between the two countries. In June of 2001, President Bush completed his policy towards North Korea. Bush stated that serious discussions needed to take place with Pyongyang, especially concerning the implanting the agreements laid down in the framework.

On September 11, 2001, the world changed in terms of how the United States views renegade countries. In January of 2002, Bush gave his State of the Union speech for the country. In his speech, Bush criticized North Korea for “arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while starving its citizens.” Bush branded North Korea as one of the “axis of evil”, along with Iran and Iraq. He stated in his speech that the axis of evil was; “arming to threaten the peace of the world.” A few months after the speech was given to the nation and the world, Bush refused to certify North Korea’s compliance with the agreed framework. Over the next few months, the US put increasingly more pressure on the North Korean government to comply with the framework agreement. In October of 2002, the “bombshell” was dropped in relations with the US and North Korea when James Kelly, the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visited the North Korean government in Pyongyang. At this meeting, the north admitted to having an active program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. The only reason the North Korean government came out about their program was that the US was fully aware of the program being in use in North Korea. Before coming out with this information, North Korea repeatedly denied having any program of the sort. With this information out, Pyongyang was very much in breach of the framework that they had agreed to. State spokesman Richard Boucher stated, “North Korea’s secret nuclear program is a serious violation of North Korea’s commitments under the agreed framework as well as under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty…”

With the major announcement from North Korea about having a nuclear program, the shipments of heavy oil were suspended, and the fallout continued. In late November 2002, the IAEA passed a resolution that called on North Korea to clarify its “reported uranium-enrichment program.” Pyongyang rejected this demand from the IAEA, saying that the IAEA’s position is based on its biasness towards the United States. From this point, the North Korean government took even more of a drastic step. It sent word to the IAEA that it will be restarting one of its functional reactors and will be opening the other nuclear reactors frozen under the agreed framework. The government also demanded that the IAEA remove the seals and monitoring equipment from the nuclear facilities. Following this, the North Korean government also sent word to the IAEA that the matter over the nuclear facilities was between the US and the North Korean government, not the IAEA. They further went on to state that either the IAEA will remove the seals or monitoring equipment, or the North Korean government will. Within two weeks of sending the message to the IAEA, North Korea cuts the seals and removes the monitoring equipment, allowing the movement of fresh rods into the reactor. Within weeks of the removal of the seals/monitoring equipment being removed, North Korea demands the withdrawal of the IAEA inspectors who left by the end of the year.

With the withdrawal of the inspectors, the IAEA had to act. Within the first week of January 2003, the board of IAEA governors convened and adopted a resolution that condemned North Korea. This resolution stated that the board condemns Korea’s decision to restart its nuclear reactor and resume operation of its related facilities. It calls for North Korea to meet immediately with IAEA officials, reestablish the seals and monitoring equipment, and make information known to the IAEA about their uranium-enrichment program. It further states that the agency is allowed to verify that all the North’s nuclear material is declared, and subject to safeguards. A week after the resolution passing by the IAEA, North Korea had announced their withdrawal from the NPT, effective immediately. Although as stated before, Article X does allow a country to withdrawal from the NPT, the country must wait three months until it’s officially out. North Korea made the argument that because it made the announcement back in March of 1993, and only suspended the decision, that it was not subject to the three-month notice. However, the IAEA rejects this notion, and states that the agency still considers North Korea bound to the NPT for its three-month period. In response to North Korea’s rejection of IAEA’s 2002 and 2003 resolutions, the IAEA adopts a resolution in February of 2003 stating that North Korea is in non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT, and refers the matter to the United Nations Security Council for review.

Within two months of withdrawing from the NPT, US officials confirmed that the five-megawatt reactor has been restarted; this reactor had been frozen under the Agreed Framework. A month later, the United States along with North Korea held trilateral talks in Beijing. North Korea had told the US delegation that it had produced nuclear weapons and had them available. This is the first time that Pyongyang had ever admitted to having nuclear weapons available. At this meeting, the North Korea delegation had told the US representatives that it might be willing to give up and get rid of their nuclear programs and stop the exporting of missiles, however they would want something considerable in return for this action. The US in return, said that it wants the immediate reversal and elimination of the North’s nuclear weapons before it discusses any type of benefits for Pyongyang. (RL report) The North further drops a bomb shell stating that it might even test the nuclear weapons, and even more of a major issue, export them to another country.

Between May and June, President Bush drew up support from countries located in North Korean’s region, between meetings with the South Korean president and Japan’s Prime Minister, the message was clear; “We will not tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea.” Both countries stated that there needed to be tougher restrictions on North Korea from the international community. Bush expressed his desire for South Korea and Japan to be included in the talks with North Korea, to ratchet more pressure upon Pyongyang. Pyongyang’s response to this was to still demand a one on one talk with the US, they said that it would be more “fruitful” to multilateral talks if the one on one talks occurred first.
President Bush held a joint news conference with South Korea, in that conference the Japanese Prime Minister stated that; “South Korea, the United States and Japan should take a tougher measure if North Korea escalates the situation further.” President Roh of South Korea took a more passive stance with his statement that “the Republic of Korea takes greater weight on dialogue, while both dialogue and pressure are important factor in regard to the issue of North Korea.” However, in multinational meeting, South Korea and Japan rejected the US’s proposal for the halting of the light water reactor in North Korea. This further complicates matters for the US, as the halting of the reactor was viewed as another ratchet of pressure upon the North Korean government.

In August of 2003, the North Korean government released a press statement that stated the only way to dissolve the current crisis, was for the US and Pyongyang to sign a non-aggression pact. It continues on to say that it is virtually impossible for any type of inspections to be done on the North Korean facilities without changes to the US policy against Pyongyang. However, the US doesn’t see any change necessary, and continues to put pressure on the demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons and programs.

The first of six party talks were held in Beijing in August of 2003. Unfortunately, things did not go well. North Korea did agree with the five other countries on having a nuclear free North Korean peninsula, but had demanded from the United States diplomatic recognition, a security guarantee and aid before it allowed any type of inspection or monitoring of the nuclear program. North Korea also had threatened to test a nuclear weapon, using it as a bargaining chip from the other nations. The US on the other hand demanded that North Korea disarm and dismantle any nuclear weapon or program before any benefits would be given to the North. The talks didn’t come out with any viable resolution, and North Korea announced afterwards that they don’t see any reason to continue these kinds of talks, and consider the possession of nuclear weapons as a self-defense measure.

In the Fall of 2003, North Korea continued to restart its nuclear program with having all of its nuclear facilities are currently now online. Between the United States and North Korea, both sides still state the need for each other to comply with the demands held in the August 6 party conference. Not a lot of progress was made in the Fall, as both sides did not have any indication of budging from their positions. Not a lot, if any progress was really made up until the start of the second round of six country party talks in Beijing. Even at this second meeting, no progress was made except for the meeting of a third round in June. Both the US and North Korea’s position on the matter stayed the same from the year before, not making any type of real indications of backing down.

At the third round of 6 party talks in Beijing, as with the other round of talks, there was no agreement that came out. The only semi-agreement that was made was for that all parties had agreed that the way to denuclearize was to use a step by step program; each program would start with the freezing of nuclear programs on the part of the North Koreans. However, each side had different proposals as to how this was to be done. The US proposed that North Korea freeze their nuclear program for three months in exchange for security assurances and energy benefits provided by China, Japan and South Korea. North Korea on the other hand reported that in order for there to be a freezing of nuclear facilities, there must be a reward given to them that includes the removal of North Korea from the state sponsored terrorism list, lifting economic sanctions and the participation of the initial energy provision assistance.

Between the third round of talks and the end of 2004, North Korea took an even more defiant stand against the United States. Pyongyang rejected the idea of returning for another round of six party talks, until the US makes appropriate steps in the North’s demands. First, the US must drop its hostile policy towards the North and join a program that provides economic aid to North Korea. In response, Colin Powell rejected these terms, saying that in order to receive any type of aid, the North must dismantle their nuclear program first and he urges the North to rejoin the talks for a fourth round.
For the year 2005, there still has been no progress on the situation with North Korea. For the first time, (in February) North Korea admitted to having nuclear weapons to the public, citing the need for possessing the nuclear weapons as “self defense”. Furthermore, it goes on to blame the need for nuclear weapons because of the hostility the United States shows towards Pyongyang. Talks for the fourth round did begin however starting in September of 2005. On the first day, an agreement was reached that stated the North would “abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs”. In return, the US stated that it had no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and the US had no intention of attacking the North with any type of military action. All parties agreed to setup another meeting sometime at the end of 2005 in Beijing.

As of right now, this is where the United States and the North stand. Unfortunately, as North Korea has shown in the past, they cannot be trusted to uphold any type of an agreement. The North has shown that it cannot be trusted, they continued to stall for time in the early 90s with the nuclear program, and they’re starting it up again in the present time. The United States is correct in its assessment of North Korea; they cannot be trusted, period. North Korea has not shown any willingness to abide by any agreements set forth by the United States or the international community, they continue to agree and then either later disagree or outright go behind the international community’s back and do it anyway.
North Korea now holds an “ace card”, of two if not three available nuclear weapons. With the US having assets in the Korean region, the United States must now take an even stronger stance against North Korea, giving into their demands will do nothing but promote more delays in the long run. They say that a man can learn a lot from looking at the past, let’s just hope the US and the international community sees that we aren’t dealing with a rational nation, but a rogue nation that doesn’t care about how it perceives itself to the world and will do anything to keep a hold on its power.

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Because Iraq and Afghanistan are obvious and fine examples of pre-emptive strikes.

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Besides, the current Canadian Prime Minister positioned himself as a carpet for the US long before he was elected, there would be no need to launch anything. Canada would be the 51st state long before anyone ever made any suggestion of moving a single soldier.

Another fine example of "Canadian" being defined as "not American".

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It's not Bush's fault, it's not Clinton's fault; it's NK's fault that they're breaking all these international agreements and threatening the South. It's also not our fault that Bin Laden and the other wacko islamofacists want to forcibly convert the West to Islam. It's not Bush's fault we were attacked on 9/11 and it's not Clinton's fault either. Again it's not our fault. When are we going to stop blaming ourselves for the atrocities committed against us by our enemies? We're undermining our own interests and falling apart as a country because of this divisive self-blaming.

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I hate to crib Glenn Greenwald's blog again, but he responded to your argument in an update to the post I cited earlier:

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A couple of commenters have argued that there is a fourth option -- U.N. sanctions -- but sanctions are properly seen as a negotiating tool and thus a subset of option (2). Sanctions are intended to pressure a country into capitulating to an agreement on favorable terms. But whether they are viewed as a tool for negotiations or as an option unto themselves, they are scorned just the same by the anti-diplomacy crowd as a form of "appeasement." The argument that is advanced is that countries such as North Korea and Iran are so irrational, deceitful and evil that they can never be trusted to comply with the terms of any agreement -- whether the agreement is brought about by negotiations or sanctions. Only regime change, via military force, provides the necessary assurances.

Sounds about right to me.

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"poliferation" - An unchecked spreading of pols?

-Zeke